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Abstract 
The Post-COM Internet: 
Toward Regular and Objective Procedures for Internet Governance 
Milton L. Mueller & Lee W. McKnight 
This paper makes the case for using regular and objective procedures to assign 
new Internet top-level domain names (TLDs) instead of the unscheduled, irregular, 
discretionary and ad hoc processes and criteria currently used by the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Adopting a regularized process is past due:  
after 5 years of existence, ICANN has yet to define a method for managing TLD 
additions to the root. Yet, the root of the DNS is an important international resource, and 
handling applications for new TLDs is one of ICANN’s most significant policy 
responsibilities. The paper shows that ICANN’s current approach to TLD additions is 
anti-competitive and fosters rent-seeking, political strife, and the potential if not the 
reality for corruption.  At the least it perpetuates the perception of ICANN as operating 
with irregular and subjective procedures. This is a disservice both to ICANN and to the 
broader Internet community.  
The paper proposes a procedure for adding 40 top-level domains to the Internet 
domain name system on an annual basis. It puts forward a process for doing so that is 
predictable in timing and procedure, rule-driven, and economically efficient. Separate 
rounds would be held for commercial and noncommercial applicants, with 10 
noncommercial TLDs and 30 commercial ones being added yearly.  
The paper analyzes the technical constraints on TLD additions and shows that the 
DNS (Domain Name System) protocol imposes only two significant limitations: the 
number of additions should be set at a low enough level to retain the hierarchical 
structure of the name space, and the rate of change in the root zone should not exceed the 
capacity of the root zone manager to accurately and reliably update and distribute the root 
zone file. In response to these constraints, we propose capping TLD additions at 40 per 
year. The specific number is admittedly arbitrary; in fact, any number between 30 and 
100 would be acceptable according to many experts. For the sake of procedural simplicity 
and business certainty we argue that it makes sense to fix the number at a known level. 
We also show that root server load is not a serious factor limiting TLD additions.  
The paper argues that there is now and likely always will be demand for TLD 
additions. The paper suggests that ICANN’s role is not to second-guess the marketplace 
by choosing which of these TLDs are “good ideas” or most likely to succeed, but simply 
to coordinate TLD assignments. Consumers and suppliers interacting in the marketplace 
should determine which ones succeed. The paper concludes by anticipating and 
attempting to answer arguments that might be advanced against the proposed procedure.   
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Critics charge that it [ICANN] is the De Beers of the Internet: an organization  
that, like the diamond car el, has created an artificial scarcity to protect  
a few established players. --Simson Garfinkle, Technology Review, March 2003 
 
1. Managing the Domain Name System (DNS) Name Space: Time 
for a new policy 
ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, was created 
to manage the root of the Internet’s global domain name system (DNS). As the quotation 
above suggests, ICANN suffers from an image problem in spite of the arcane nature of its 
tasks and functions. One of the most important aspects of that function is to make policy 
decisions about how top-level domain names (TLDs) are added.1  Before a top-level 
domain name registry such as .com or .info can function, it must be entered into the root 
zone file of the DNS. ICANN is the gatekeeper of the commonly accepted DNS root. It 
has the authority to decide what names are added to it, what pace they can be added at, 
what criteria will be used to determine who gets the available name assignments, and 
who gets to operate the registries. Policy conflict over adding new TLDs is one of the 
issues that led to the creation of ICANN in the first place.2 
ICANN’s decisions about TLDs have an economic as well as a technical 
dimension. By controlling the addition of top-level domains, ICANN controls the supply 
of a valued resource (domain names) as well as the degree of differentiation in the market 
(which names exist).3 Adding TLDs also determines how much competition there is in 
the market for domain name registration services, because it expands the supply of names 
and can also increase the number of firms offering services to the public. Restricting the 
number of TLDs limits competitive entry into the market and limits consumer choices.  
 
1 An earlier draft of this paper was released as a white paper entitled “The Post-.COM Internet. A 
Five Step Process for Top Level Domain Additions” by Syracuse University’s School of Information 
Studies Digital Convergence Center in March 2003, and presented formally and informally to several 
groups at ICANN’s Rio meeting, March 23-27, 2003. That version is available at www.digital-
convergence.info.  Intellectual contributions and support for the research contributing to the views 
expressed in the white paper from Bob Frankston, Simson Garfinkle, Marengo Research LLC, Paul 
Mockapetris, Nokia, and Stefaan Verhulst of the Markle Foundation, are gratefully acknowledged. 
However, the views expressed both in the white paper and in this paper are those of the authors, and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the School of Information Studies, Syracuse University, or any other 
institution with which the authors are affiliated.     
2 “The new corporation ultimately should have the authority to manage and perform a specific set 
of functions related to coordination of the domain name system, including the authority necessary to: …3) 
oversee policy for determining the circumstances under which new TLDs are added to the root system.” 
U.S. Department of Commerce, NTIA, “Management of Names and Addresses,” Statement of Policy (The 
White Paper), Docket Number: 980212036-8146-02, June 5, 1998. See also Mueller, Ruling the Root, 
(MIT Press, 2002) Chapter 6. 
3 We assume that the reader is familiar with what a domain name is and with the hierarchical 
structure of the domain name space.   For more information, see Mueller, 2002. 
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Significant attention has been given to the debates over ICANN’s governance 
structure and its attempts to change that structure.4 This paper is not about those debates. 
It is a long-overdue look at the single most important area of substantive policy under 
ICANN’s jurisdiction, namely the addition of new TLDs. This paper identifies a policy 
vacuum around TLD additions that has been allowed to exist for too long. It proposes a 
new policy approach that would make room for innovation and improve the fairness, 
efficiency, and competitiveness of DNS management. The authors believe that these 
policies should be adopted regardless of how ICANN makes it decisions, or what 
methods it uses to select its Board and develop its policies. 
Does anybody care about new TLDs? For a few years in the late 1990s, top-level 
domains were assumed to be licenses to print money. Domain names at any level were 
assumed to have enormous power to attract Internet traffic. Those expectations have been 
deflated by the Internet bust of the new Millennium, and by greater sophistication among 
users. It is noteworthy, however, that the overall market for domain names declined by 
only about 10 percent in late 2001 and the first half of 2002, and then resumed its global 
growth. Certainly, the domain name land rush and the hysteria of the Internet boom 
period are things of the past. Does this mean that the issue of new TLDs is moot, and that 
there is no pressing need to address the issue? No. That perspective is as superficial and 
wrong as the overblown expectations of the boom years. It is like saying that the 
slowdown in 3G wireless development means that we don’t need to worry about how the 
radio spectrum is managed anymore.  
The domain name space is still a valuable resource and we still need to manage it 
properly. The market for domain name related services is a significant part of the 
Internet, representing about US$ 3 billion in annual revenues. A new standard for 
internationalized domain names (IDN) has been created by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force, allowing domain names to be written in non-ASCII scripts and thereby creating 
the potential for a dramatic expansion in the market. There are now and will continue to 
be legitimate requests for the addition of new TLDs, which we discuss in the next 
section. At least a dozen companies who applied to ICANN for the right to operate a 
TLD registry in 2000 but were turned down are still willing and able to operate a registry. 
New names (e.g., .blog or .enum) that identify new communities or services have come 
into being. Last, but by no means least, we must not forget that at the registry level, the 
market for generic TLD registration services is still highly concentrated, with one 
operator (VeriSign) controlling over 85 percent of the market.5 That level of market 
concentration could be remedied over time with new entry and new, meaningful TLDs.  
The basic points we wish to make are these: 
• ICANN needs to define routine, sensible procedures to add TLDs.  
                                                 
4 H. Klein (ed.), 2001; NAIS, 2001; Froomkin, 2000; Mueller, 1999. 
5 As of the 3rd Quarter of 2002, there were a total of 30.5 million domain names registered in the 
generic top-level domains (.com, .net. org, .info, .biz, .name, .cc, .tv, .ws). VeriSign owns and operates 
.com (21.4 million registrations), .net (3.62 million registrations), .tv (475,000 registrations) and .cc 
(581,000 registrations). 
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• Those procedures should work regardless of whether the market is booming or 
in decline.  
• ICANN’s procedures for adding TLDs should be demand-driven, light 
handed, and focused on coordinating the technical parameters of DNS rather 
than regulation and restriction of the market.  
• Users and suppliers interacting in the market, not ICANN, should decide 
whether specific TLDs are valuable or not. 
 
 
gTLD Registry Market Share, 3Q 2002
Afilias - .org, .info
11% ALL OTHERS
4%
VeriSign- .com, 
.net, .tv, .cc - 85%
 
Figure 1: gTLD Market Share 
(source: State of the Domain 3Q 2002 Report) 
 
1.1 The continuing need for new competition 
One of ICANN’s most widely acknowledged successes was the creation of retail-
level competition for the registration of .com, .net, and .org domain names. This was 
done by imposing, by regulatory fiat, a vertical separation between the wholesale 
“registry” functions, and retail “registrar” functions. In the major generic TLDs regulated 
by ICANN, these “retail” functions of registrars must be separated from the “wholesale” 
registry functions of maintaining the zone files.6  
                                                 
6 In essence, registries operate public databases that exclusively assign second-level names under 
TLDs and provide, in real time, the name resolution data needed to use the names for communication over 
the Internet. Registrars, on the other hand, directly interact with customers to perform the functions of 
accepting customer orders for specific names, maintaining customer accounts, billing customers, accepting 
changes from customers, notifying them of expiration, and so on. 
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In the registrar market, ICANN has implemented a simple accreditation process 
that allows any business meeting certain qualifications to enter the market and compete.7 
This approach has worked beautifully at making the retail market competitive. It has 
driven down prices and improved service. In contrast to the registrar market, ICANN has 
failed to create sufficient competition in the registry market. There is no reason why the 
registry market could not be as competitive as the registrar market. In this paper, we 
propose a basic accreditation scheme for registries and a basic limit on the number of 
new TLDs added per year that would make the registry market open and competitive as 
well. 
It is important to understand the importance of competition at the registry level. 
Registries are the critical infrastructure of the domain name system. Registrars are just 
intermediary services built on top of that infrastructure. Ultimately, effective competition 
in domain services requires open entry and robust competition at both the registry and 
registrar segments of the market. If there is insufficient competition in the registry 
market, the whole domain name services industry is not sufficiently competitive. For 
example, the continued dominance of .com means that the secondary market for domain 
names, which now constitutes one of the most profitable and important aspects of the 
entire domain name market, is controlled almost entirely by VeriSign because of its 
control of the dominant .com top-level domain.  
1.2 The Pathologies of ICANN’s TLD Addition Process 
Why has ICANN been unable to successfully produce competition at the registry 
level? The answer is simple and is entrenched in current ICANN processes (or the lack 
thereof): ICANN has not defined a routine method for adding top level domain names 
and for authorizing new registries to operate them.   
At present, ICANN has defined no uniform criteria for evaluating applications. It 
has fixed no regular timetable for accepting and deciding upon applications. No one 
knows when ICANN will add new TLDs. No one knows upon what basis it might choose 
to do so or refuse to do so. When it does decide to add new TLDs, as it recently did at its 
June 2003 Montreal meeting, its staff has to make up a new set of criteria and rules, 
basically from scratch. This policy vacuum has made the addition of new domains a 
painfully slow, unpredictable, and entirely discretionary process. The effect has been to 
substantially raise the costs of entry into the domain name registry market, and to make 
insider politics rather than economic value the chief determinant of who gets to 
participate.8 The delays and costs of this non-policy have taken a terrible toll on the 
                                                 
7 ICANN’s registrar accreditation policies are posted here: 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accreditation.htm . As of July 21, 2003, there were 168 accredited registrars 
from more than 20 countries. 
8 For example, one of the driving factors in the current round of “sponsored” TLD additions is 
insider lobbying. The proponents of a .travel TLD retained a well-liked and -respected former ICANN 
Board member, Ken Fockler, to promote their case for a new round of sponsored TLD additions to the 
Board. We wish to make it clear that we are not accusing Mr. Fockler of unethical behavior. Our point, 
rather, is that ICANN’s lack of a procedure makes it virtually impossible for new TLD additions to occur in 
any other way than through applicant lobbying of the Board and management. 
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domain name industry. They have prolonged the dominance of a few well-entrenched 
players for years and led to the destruction of several innovative businesses that 
attempted to compete as domain name registries.9 The authors believe that that failure 
negatively affects competition and undermines ICANN’s quest for global legitimacy.  
One can get a better idea of how dilatory ICANN’s TLD addition process has 
become by examining the timetable chart on the next page. See Figure 1. The first round 
of TLD additions began in August 1999, with the formation of a Domain Name 
Supporting Organization Working Group. Not until July of 2003 did the last of the seven 
TLDs added in that round actually become operational. But technically, the process of 
round one is still not concluded. ICANN’s overly cautious approach to TLD additions 
defined the addition of seven TLDs in 2000 as an “experiment” or “proof of concept” 
which was supposed to be followed by an “evaluation study.” Although July 2003 was 
the projected date for completion of the Evaluation, this deadline assumed that, by 
September 2002, an RFP for the evaluation would be drafted by staff and approved by the 
board, an evaluator selected, and the evaluation launched. As of July 2003, however, no 
such RFP had been issued. Thus, the process is at least 10 months behind schedule, and 
the completion date would have to be pushed back to May 2004 at the earliest. Based on 
the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that, left to its own devices, it will take ICANN over 
five years to complete all aspects of the first round of TLD additions. At the end of that 
process, it still will not have developed a routine method of adding TLDs; it will only 
have an assessment or evaluation of the first seven additions – a number and process it 
would still consider “experimental.” 
Luckily for consumers and businesses, this state of affairs is unnecessary and can 
be remedied with a few simple reforms. ICANN’s restrictive approach to DNS regulation 
has no basis in the technical requirements of managing the system. The Domain Name 
System is a highly flexible protocol that could support many new names and a great deal 
of diversity and competition among TLD registries. Adding TLDs to the domain name 
system is a simple process technically and, within reasonable constraints, poses no 
technical risks to the operation of DNS or the Internet. It is not difficult to define 
operational requirements for a TLD registry that will avoid significant negative technical 
externalities from adding a TLD. Indeed, revenues generated by new registry fees could 
be used to finance major improvements in ICANN’s administration and in the root zone 
servers.  
1.3 Overview of the Proposal for Reform  
In response to the pressing need for a regular and objective procedure, this paper 
advances a detailed proposal. It calls upon ICANN to define an annual procedure to add 
TLD names to the root. TLD names should be proposed by applicants who perceive a 
                                                 
9 Name.space, an innovative registry that supported nearly 500 generic top-level domain names, 
and Image Online Design, which has attempted to develop a <.web> TLD since 1995 have been held in 
abeyance for nearly 6 years now. RegistryPro, although a winner of the <.pro> domain in the year 2000 
TLD additions, has been hampered by burdensome registry contract obligations. Neustar’s (.biz) financial 
viability was harmed by the over-investment that is typical of limited markets allocated through beauty 
contests, where applicants have a strong incentive to promise more than they can deliver. 
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commercial, technical, or social need for them. The paper proposes to cap the number of 
TLDs added per year at 40, a number that is technically and operationally safe. There 
would be two rounds of additions each year. In the first round, ten (10) slots would be 
open for noncommercial, sponsored domains and Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs). In 
the second round, thirty (30) TLD slots would be open for commercial applicants. 
Applicants would know in advance the technical and operational criteria they would have 
to meet to qualify; there would be a registry accreditation process that would become as 
basic and routine as registrar accreditation.10 Applicants would have to pay fees that 
would cover the administrative and maintenance costs of the TLD addition process. If 
there were too many applicants for the 10 noncommercial and LDC slots, a random 
selection process would be held to determine the winners. If there were more than 30 
applicants for the commercial slots the applicants would have to engage in auctions to 
determine the selections. 
The proposal is outlined in more detail in Section 4 below. A flow chart 
describing the process (Figure 2)  is shown in section 4 as well. 
 
 
(Figure 1) 
 
2. Who Needs New TLDs? 
Our reform proposal is intended to make TLD additions responsive to consumer 
demand and supplier capabilities. In this section we discuss the sources of demand for 
new Top Level Domains. 
It must be noted at the outset that the call for a TLD addition policy does not 
derive from a “shortage” of domain names as such. The current DNS name space, using 
existing TLDs and the restricted-ASCII set, is virtually infinite.11 But this is like saying 
that the world’s automotive needs could all be met by one color of car. TLD additions 
can be ignored only if one ignores user preferences, human factors issues, competition, 
and important legal and economic issues about who controls and customizes a domain 
registry. The debate over new top-level domains is really a debate about the degree to 
which DNS administration should respond to human factors, user demand and 
competition policy concerns. It’s a question of who is in charge: users or the DNS 
administrator.  
                                                 
10 A registrar spokesperson prominent in ICANN has proposed a registry accreditation process 
here: http://r.tucows.com/archives/2003/03/13/new_gtlds_part_ii.html  
11 If users didn’t care about who managed their domain, or about price and service competition, 
there would be no need for additional TLDs. If users were willing to register meaningless identifiers such 
as ghfhjj-u0-99wwwery.net, or if they were satisfied with names that went into deeper and deeper levels of 
the naming hierarchy, such as nuts.to.this.name.syr.edu, the DNS could easily accommodate all 
conceivable future registrations without any change. 
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Figure 1: Timetable for new TLD intro  
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As we show below, namespace expansion would give users choices of identifiers 
that conform more closely to their preferences. Adding new TLDs would also provide an 
opportunity for new companies to enter the industry and try out new service concepts. It 
is important to emphasize the following point: It does not really matter whether a new, 
open policy toward TLD additions results in one hundred successful new names and 
registries over the next five years, or only one or two successful new names and 
registries. The point is that the market would be able to respond to consumer demand and 
supplier innovation. The resulting market structure would better be able to discover and 
respond to what people want and need. The other benefit is that ICANN’s processes 
would be relieved of the unsavory politicking that currently accompanies discretionary 
awards of TLDs.  
2.1 The demand for new top-level domain names 
One can identify at least six distinct sources of demand for new top-level 
domains. 
1. A choice of more desirable names. Given a choice between a meaningless 
domain name and a meaningful, catchy one, most users prefer the latter. Users 
may want more choices regarding the identity they project online. They may want 
the domain name they use, either as an email addresses or web site URL, to make 
a particular kind of statement. Thus, while the current top-level names provide 
only a handful of generic strings such as .com, .net, .org, or .info, end users might 
prefer additional options, such as .shop, .zone, .free, .blog, .sucks, etc. Bear in 
mind that to someone who reads Chinese characters and not English, 
business.com is as meaningless as ghfhjj-u0-99wwofrz.com. The demand for 
incorporating new language scripts into the DNS is derived from the same 
economic and human factors as the demand for new top-level domains. It is clear 
that real demand for a wider choice of names exists. The first two new open TLDs 
created by ICANN, .biz and .info, generated approximately a million paid 
registrations each after a year of operation. It took Network Solutions more than 
five years to register a million .com names. Even the new TLD names offered by 
alternative root system operator New.net have received tens of thousands of 
registrations, despite the severe handicap of being invisible to many users of the 
Internet.  
2. A more persistent and portable name. Users who have an email address under 
their Internet Service Provider’s name (e.g., user@aol.com) may want to expand 
their service options by obtaining their own domain (e.g., me@myname.tld). 
Controlling your own domain has several desirable consequences. The email 
address is likely to be more memorable and to match more closely the preferences 
of the user. A user-owned email address is also likely to be more persistent than 
one associated with an ISP or a third-party provider’s email service. If an ISP 
goes out of business, raises its prices or offers poor service, users would be forced 
to change providers. If their domain name or email address is derived from their 
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ISP, it will have to be changed when they switch providers.12 Registering a 
domain name gives the user a form of address portability. A user’s email address 
can remain constant when using different ISPs. This lowers consumers’ switching 
costs and makes the ISP market more competitive, just as number portability does 
in the voice telephony market. 
3. Shorter names. Given a choice between a longer and/or deeply hierarchical 
domain name and a shorter, flatter one, users will probably prefer the shorter one. 
Users may want to move up the DNS hierarchy; i.e., they may want a second-
level domain instead of a third-level domain, or a top-level domain instead of a 
second-level domain. Moving up the hierarchy shortens the name, making it more 
easily usable.  
4. More control over the name. Moving up the hierarchy also increases the 
consumer’s legal, economic and technical control over the administration of the 
name. In a hierarchical name space, an identifier is dependent upon the registrants 
above them in the hierarchy. Organizations higher-up in the contractual chain 
must operate the name servers pointing to lower levels in the hierarchy. The 
“higher-ups” have the leverage to impose policies regarding use, prices, name 
selection etc. on people lower down in the hierarchy. To escape these constraints, 
end users may want to move up the hierarchy. As an analogy, many companies 
heavily dependent on networks may choose to “in-source” their network operation 
and management functions and avoid dependence on telecommunication service 
vendors. Likewise, some companies may prefer to in-source their DNS by 
operating a TLD, thereby minimizing reliance on external registry firms. A 
corporation to whom online identity is essential, such as AOL or Amazon.com, 
may decide that it wants to “in-source” its DNS management functions 
completely and eliminate its dependence on VeriSign.  
5. Verifying identity. Some groups of organizations may want to establish a 
controlled name space, analogous to <.edu> for US universities, to promote 
authenticity of online identity. Control of a top-level domain gives one the 
authority to impose authentication or conduct rules on those within the name 
space. 
6. Competition. Market competition may induce companies to enter markets to 
compete for registration business already served inadequately by other businesses. 
For example, the <.name> TLD is targeted at personalized domain names, but 
their business model and policy restrictions are unattractive to many registrants, 
and they have not won the support of registrars. As a consequence, the number of 
registrations in the <.name> TLD is fairly low, and the important market for 
                                                 
12 Hundreds of thousands of Internet users were reminded of the need for this when AT&T 
Broadband was forced to stop using the domain name <mediaone.net> as part of a legal settlement. Around 
630,000 end users had to suffer the inconvenience of changing their email addresses and web page URLs as 
a result. Indeed, ownership and other domain name changes at AT&T Broadband forced some users to go 
through 3 different email address changes in 60 days. Users incur sunk costs in the form of paid-for 
business cards and advertising expenses, as well as additional costs related to the confusion and missed 
communications engendered by the change. 
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individual registrations is being poorly served. An alternative TLD for personal 
names would add competition and choice to the market. Many policy advocates 
within ICANN’s process speak of “cloned” name spaces as if it is self-evident 
that duplicating the constituency served by one registry/name is necessarily a bad 
thing. But competition is all about overlapping services that give consumers 
choices. No one believes that Burger King should not be allowed to exist because 
McDonald’s already serves the market for fast-food burgers.  
In sum, adding top-level domains will have a major impact on a) the variety and 
usability of identifiers, b) competition, c) the ability of firms to control their digital 
identity services, and d) technical innovation.  
2.2 The Importance of Time 
If it is to maximize competition, ICANN needs to act quickly. One of the well-
known economic features of the domain name registration services market is that once 
consumers have registered a name under one TLD, they cannot easily switch to another 
one. Switching costs on the demand side are high, because consumers who use domain 
names to identify web sites or as email addresses establish value and equity in a name 
that is sacrificed if its is given up. For example, if a registrant succeeds in establishing a 
steady stream of valuable traffic to her web site at www.domainname.com, she is not 
going to give up that name just to get a slightly more desirable name or slightly lower 
price under a new .foo top-level domain. Thus, competition in the DNS market is 
fundamentally competition for new registrations. (FTC, 1998) By freezing TLD additions 
at a time when VeriSign (then Network Solutions) dominated the market, the U.S. 
Commerce Department and ICANN practically institutionalized the .com monopoly and 
made it increasingly difficult for new entrants to achieve the same size and scale. The 
longer we delay in creating a TLD addition procedure, the more constrained and locked 
in the market becomes. 
 
3. Technical constraints 
Technical risks are often cited as one reason for extreme caution in the addition of 
new top-level domains. However, these concerns are founded largely on ignorance of the 
technical workings of the domain name system. Regular additions of a fixed, modest 
number of top-level domains to the root each year pose no technical risks to the Internet. 
As a distributed open system, the Internet has many sources of instability. Some 
of the problems are intentional, such as the antics of script kiddies, criminal break-ins, 
spam, and organized denial of service attacks. Others are unintentional, stemming from 
poorly configured routers, congestion, poorly designed or badly implemented DNS 
software, inter-software incompatibilities, hardware breakdowns, and so on. All act to 
negatively affect the response times and connectivity of ordinary users. Given the broad 
range of problems that can and do afflict the Internet’s daily operation, changes in the 
number of top level domain names is, we will show, a vanishingly small part of the total 
picture. Of all the problems faced by the Internet at this point in time of terrorism and 
organized denial of service attacks, TLD additions are not what we need to worry about. 
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Having additional TLDs may even decrease the impact of various intentional or 
unintentional problems because new registries may bring a new set of service sites and 
nodes to cope with problem situations. 
It is noteworthy that respected technical experts have never voiced doubts about 
the ability of Internet technology to handle the addition of a finite number of new TLDs. 
Jon Postel, one of the original designers of the DNS protocol and for many years the 
manager of the root, proposed adding 50 new top level domains annually over a three to 
six year period in 1996.13 Paul Vixie, one of the developers of the dominant BIND 
software used by DNS name servers, went on record in an ICANN Working Group 
saying that “A million names under [the root] isn't fundamentally harder to write code or 
operate computers for than are a million names under COM.”14 Paul Mockapetris, author 
of the basic RFCs defining the DNS protocol, wrote “I'd feel safe adding a bunch of new 
TLDs, 10s or maybe 100s.”15 
Doubts about the technical risks of TLD additions have been voiced primarily for 
political and economic reasons. Some incumbent registries or registrars are concerned 
about facing additional competition.16 Some trademark holders would like to prevent the 
creation of new spaces where name speculation or cyber-squatting might occur. In both 
cases, however, the objections are based on economic policy preferences, not technical 
risk. 
Whatever the merits of placing regulatory or economic restraints on TLD 
additions, we must clearly distinguish between restraints based on technical factors and 
those based on economic protectionism or regulatory control. If willing buyers and 
willing suppliers of new services are being deprived of the right to enter a market, sound 
public policy dictates that we correctly identify and openly debate the real reasons why. 
In this section, we show that there is no ambiguity whatsoever about the technical 
capability of the DNS to support TLD additions at the rate we propose. To make this case 
we need to back up and describe some basic technical features of the DNS. 
                                                 
13 Draft-postel 1996. The proposal is archived here: http://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail-archives/dns-
wg/1996/msg00055.html. While this plan was rejected, its failure was not due to technical concerns about 
expansion of the root zone. 
14 Vixie’s message was sent to the ICANN DNSO Working Group on new Top-level domains, 
(Working Group C), 15 December 1999. http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-c/Arc01/msg00203.html  
15 Paul Mockapetris to Jon Weinberg, and reposted to Working Group C, Dec 15, 1999. In 
response to an earlier draft of this paper, Mockapetris added, “while you quote me as saying adding 10s or 
100s was safe, you should understand that the quote was in the context of recommending a conservative 
course, and not to dispute the million delegation remarks of Vixie, merely to start slow toward the million 
(assuming that turned out to be a useful place to go).” (email communication, date….) 
16 Roland LaPlante, Chief Marketing Officer of Afilias, was quoted in a news report as cautioning 
against introducing any significant new TLDs in the near future. The reason? "[W]e must allow adequate 
time... [so] that their introduction does not negatively crowd or disrupt the current registration 
marketplace by offsetting the existing supply versus demand structure.” See ICANN Blog, 
http://icann.blog.us/2002/10/23.html  
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3.1 The Root Zone File 
The domain name system is a distributed database. It allows users anywhere on 
the Internet to submit a query (a domain name) and receive the right information in 
return: the IP address of the queried domain, or other records. The DNS as a total system 
responds to billions of queries every hour.  
The DNS name space is organized hierarchically. The root only contains 
information about the very top level of the hierarchy. Information about the lower levels 
is held by a network of local, national, or global name servers. Most of the real work of 
DNS is done by these name servers, not by the centralized root. There are more than half 
a million name servers around the world, and they are operated by individuals, small 
organizations, large enterprises, ISPs, and the major domain name registries and 
registrars. Information about how to resolve domain names is cached (stored) locally, so 
that most users’ queries can be answered locally and never go to the root.  
The DNS root is just a set of 13 name servers at the top of the naming hierarchy. 
It contains the authoritative list of top level domains, and associates each TLD name with 
second-level name servers that hold authoritative information about second-level names 
under each TLD. The root’s authoritative list of TLDs is called the root zone file. 
The root zone file is a simple ASCII text file. At the beginning of 2003, it 
contained records for 258 TLDs. 243 of them are country codes drawn from the ISO-
3166-1 list. Fifteen of them are so-called “generic” or global names such as .info or .com. 
For each TLD, there is an average of ten (10) records in the root zone file. As noted 
above, these records provide the information needed to direct queries to the proper name 
servers of second-level domain registries. Thus, there are a total of only 2573 records in 
the root zone. The whole file consumes only 100 kilobytes of storage. It is much smaller 
than a one page letter written in MS Word software. Ten copies of the root zone could be 
stored on a 3½ inch floppy disk.  
The U.S. Commerce Department holds ultimate policy authority over the content 
of the root zone file. The U.S. Commerce Department has delegated to ICANN the 
responsibility for handling requests for changes to the root zone and working out the 
policies that govern how and why those changes are made. Thus, any changes to the root 
zone must first be approved by ICANN and then go to the U.S. Department of Commerce 
for final approval. 
Once changes are made, they must be distributed across all 13 of the Internet’s 
root servers. Operationally, VeriSign Global Registry Services administers the primary 
root server (the so-called “A” root), which is the most current and authoritative version of 
the root zone file. All authorized updates and changes to the root zone file start at the A 
root and are distributed to the other 12 servers at least twice daily.  
3.2 Technical constraints on new TLDs 
There are three possible ways in which TLD additions might impact technical 
stability: 
• The need for a finite limit on the number of TLDs 
• Root zone file flux 
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• Root server load 
By “need for a finite limit” we mean that the DNS is a hierarchical name space, a 
tree structure the design of which presumes there are fewer names at the top of the tree 
and more names as one goes down into the branches. If TLDs were added in a way that 
allowed or encouraged all names to be registered at the root, then the hierarchical 
structure of the name space would be defeated. That would undermine the robust, 
distributed nature of the Internet and make it far too dependent on a single point of failure 
(the root). 
By “root zone file flux,” we refer to the rate at which the content of the root zone 
file changes. If the root zone file must be changed frequently, the updates distributed too 
often and there are large numbers of changes, there is a greater risk that errors will be 
made.  
By “root server load,” we refer to the rate at which the root servers are queried by 
computers connected to the Internet. If the query load exceeds the capacity of the root 
server system, then the performance of the DNS system as a whole would be impaired.  
Below, we show that first two issues can be easily addressed by simply fixing the 
number of TLD additions at a safe pace and number. We also show that TLD addition at 
the recommended pace (40 per year) is unlikely to have any discernable effect on root 
server load. 
3.2.1 Finite Limit 
It is a simple matter to address the first potential problem. One need only specify 
a finite limit to the number of TLDs that can be added over time. There is no precise way 
to define what this limit should be, so the choice of a specific number is necessarily 
somewhat arbitrary. But if the purpose is to retain the hierarchical nature of the name 
space, it is clear that with tens of millions of second-level domain names one could add 
hundreds of TLDs annually and still retain a hierarchical structure. In this paper, we have 
proposed making it possible to add 40 new TLDs annually. (Note well that we are talking 
about accommodating a maximum of 40 applications – if there were fewer than 40 
qualifying applications in a year there would be fewer than 40 additions.) This is a quite 
conservative number. It would take more than six years of additions at the limit for the 
number of TLDs to double.  
3.2.1 Root zone flux 
Adding TLDs has linear effects on the size of the root zone file; it neither 
increases nor decreases the number of records required by each TLD. Thus, if the 
maximum of 40 TLDs were added each year, it would take a decade for the zone file to 
double in size to 218 kilobytes. By contemporary standards, this is still a very small file. 
The processing power required to search it to match queries would not increase 
appreciably. 
Senior figures within the Internet technical community, such as Paul Vixie and 
Karl Auerbach, have pointed out that the root servers use the same technology as the 
name servers for the top-level domains. In that respect, the root zone file is no different 
from any other DNS zone file. There are millions of functioning registrations in the .com, 
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.net, .org, .de, and .uk zone files, and changes, deletions and additions occur on a minute-
by-minute basis. Those zones work reliably. Hence, from a purely operational standpoint 
one might reasonably conclude that there could be millions of top-level domains.  
There is one important difference about the root zone, however: errors or 
corrupted files at the root level could have more damaging consequences for Internet 
users than mistakes that occur lower in the hierarchy. An erroneous root zone file could 
result in the inaccessibility of entire TLDs, containing thousands or even millions of user 
identities, until the problem was fixed. The effects of a corrupted TLD zone file, on the 
other hand, would be limited to second-level names and hence the bad effects would be 
more localized (although here, too, a major second-level domain name such as <aol.com> 
could affect millions of users). Thus, there is a valid technical concern about limiting the 
rate at which the root zone changes in order to minimize the risk of propagating errors in 
the root zone. (In this regard, the size of the <.com> zone has been a problem; in the past 
Network Solutions has experienced sporadic trouble updating and distributing it properly, 
although for the most part it works remarkably reliably given the rate at which it 
changes.) 
Some Internet technologists believe that root zone changes could and should be 
automated. More conservative engineers, on the other hand, believe that the root zone 
must continue to be altered by hand and subject to human inspection before being 
released and propagated to the root servers. Even the adherents of this most conservative 
view, however, believe that 20 – 100 additions and changes in the root zone file made in 
batch mode at a specific periodic rate, such as annually or every six months, are safe. 
Thus, with regard to the rate at which the root zone can change there are no serious 
technical objections to the addition of 40 or so new TLDs being added annually to the 
root zone. Indeed, that number comes in below the middle of the safe spectrum. 
There is no doubt about the ability of the root servers to handle this level of 
addition: 
• It has already been proposed by experts. As noted earlier, the original root 
administrator and one of the designers of the DNS, the late Dr. Jon Postel, 
proposed adding 50 new TLDs a year for three years in a row back in 1996. More 
recently, Paul Hoffman, chair of an IETF working group on a DNS-related 
standard, publicly proposed adding 25 every six months.17  
• We have already done it. During the early and mid-1990s, as country code TLDs 
were being delegated, the root zone was expanding by 10-20 TLDs or more per 
year for nearly a decade. From 1994 to 1996, 40 or more TLDs were added each 
year. At that time the root zone file was managed by the equivalent of one full-
time person. Moreover, the technology has become more powerful. Thus, there is 
no factual basis for viewing the proposed rate of addition as a technical risk. 
                                                 
17 Paul Hoffman, “Reforming the Administration of the DNS Root,” April 25, 2002. 
http://www.proper.com/ICANN-notes/dns-root-admin-reform.html 
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3.2.2 Root server load 
The only other technical concern raised by the addition of new TLDs is how TLD 
additions affect the query load on the root servers. Root server load is a topic on which a 
great deal of measurement and research has taken place in the last three years. In 
particular, a number of studies carried out by the Cooperative Association for Internet 
Data Analysis (CAIDA)18 from 2000 to the present have examined the number and type 
of queries received by the root servers, as well as the response times of the root servers.19 
These studies make it clear that, relative to other dominating factors, the number of top-
level domains in the root zone file could have only a miniscule effect on the overall load 
of the servers.  
Currently, the most active root servers receive around 3000 queries per second, 
totaling 250-300 million per day for each server. The query load has increased steadily as 
the Internet has grown. Most of the growth occurred when no TLDs were added, from 
1996 to 2001, making it clear that usage, not the number of TLDs as such, is the key 
factor. Hardware and software upgrades have enabled the servers to keep up.  
Although the number of IP addresses assigned to root name servers is limited to 
thirteen, the number of computers that can be linked to each address is not restricted. 
Thus, root name servers can be implemented on several machines. In the Fall of 2002, the 
ability of root servers to expand their capacity was dramatically improved by application 
of the “BGP anycast” technique, which has allowed mirror copies of the F root server to 
be established in Spain and the Asia-Pacific region. Measurements conducted by Rob 
Thomas’s “DNS Data” web site show a dramatic improvement in the response times of 
the F root server since these changes were made.20 The M root server in Japan is also 
taking steps to expand its capacity in the same way. These new configurations make it 
unlikely that the query load will exceed computing capacity of the root name servers any 
time soon. 
Studies of the composition of the queries that go to the root servers make it even 
clearer that root server load is not a constraint on the number of TLDs, provided that 
additions are kept to a reasonable, regular pace. The CAIDA studies indicated that almost 
98% of all the queries that go to the root are “bogus” requests caused by software 
implementation problems or other software factors. For example, one of the most serious 
causes of root server load is the absence of negative caching in the DNS software of a 
major vendor. Without negative caching, a request for a nonexistent domain can be 
repeated indefinitely, and some poorly designed programs will aggressively retransmit 
thousands of these bad requests. According to the CAIDA research, these kinds of 
problems account for 70 percent of current root server load. Other implementation 
problems account for another 28 percent of root server load. Normal, legitimate queries 
constituted only two percent of the root server load. Thus, even if doubling the number of 
                                                 
18 See http://www.caida.org/outreach/papers/. 
19 Of particular interest is D. Wessels, “Toward Lowering the Load on DNS Root Nameservers.” 
Presentation before the North American Network Operators Group (NANOG), October 2002. See also N. 
Brownlee, kc claffy, Evi Nemeth, “DNS Root/gTLD Performance Measurements,” 2001.  
20 Rob’s DNS page, www.cymru.com/DNS/  
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TLDs over a decade-long period actually doubled the number of legitimate root server 
queries, it would add only two percent to the total load. Adding TLDs would not affect 
the software configuration and implementation problems that create most of the load. 
Because the DNS relies so heavily on caching at lower levels of the name server 
hierarchy, there is no simple, linear relationship between adding TLDs and increasing 
root server load. The consensus position within IETF seems to be merely that the number 
of TLDs should be finite rather than infinite, so that the hierarchical character of name 
resolution and assignment is maintained. As IETF Chair Fred Baker put it,  
If we can add one TLD (and we obviously can), we can add 1000 TLDs to the 
[root zone] table. How that relates to [root-server] lookups for those TLDs is 
indeterminate from the fact that they are there. …The fact that we added seven 
TLDs does not mean that we have even changed the root server load, much less 
multiplied it by something. How much additional load we would get is a business 
question: how many new computers, with people using them (and what would 
they be doing, and what sites would they therefore be accessing), will be added to 
the Internet because this TLD is in operation?21 
ICANN’s initial addition of 7 new TLDs and the re-vitalization of the dormant 
<.us> TLD have led to no discernable change in root load or root server behavior. In sum, 
TLD additions have minor impact on what is a more fundamental question, which is how 
the DNS is able to scale with the growth of the Internet, and how the open Internet 
developers community can respond to software externalities in the Internet “commons.” 
Poorly implemented and/or badly designed software has the greatest impact on root 
server load. The general growth of the Internet, and new DNS applications such as 
ENUM, may have an impact. The effect of TLD additions is minimal. 
 
4. A Rational Name Space Management Regime 
In this section of the paper we propose a TLD addition process that is 
economically efficient, pro-competitive, and supportive of the long-term sustainability of 
ICANN and the root server operators.  
4.1 Criteria for a TLD Add Process 
We begin by defining five criteria that a TLD addition process must meet. In the 
process, we show that ICANN’s current process (or lack of a defined process) does not 
meet any of those criteria. 
4.1.1 Predictable in timing & procedure 
The first and in some way most basic criteria is that the process should be fixed 
and regular. TLD additions are not an “experiment” or a step into the unknown. They are 
a routine part of DNS management. Growth or change in zone files at any level of the 
DNS was always contemplated as a normal activity during the design of the protocol. 
                                                 
21 Email to author, October 11, 2002 
August 1, 2003 17
Thus, businesses or organizations interested in offering DNS services requiring a TLD 
must have a known procedure for applying for one. The procedure must follow a publicly 
defined and reasonable schedule that ICANN adheres to. Put in the simplest terms, 
applicants for TLDs should know what they have to do and when they have to do it. They 
should be assured of either a “yes” or a “no” within a defined and reasonable time frame.  
A fixed addition schedule has a number of excellent efficiency and fairness 
properties. For example, it prevents incumbent registries from exerting political pressure 
to prevent competitive entry. And it discourages exploitation of scarcity in the name 
space by suppliers or name speculators, making it clear that new TLDs will continue to 
be added and hence any business model based on exploitation of artificial scarcity will 
not succeed in the long term.  
Finally, open entry is a prerequisite for growth and innovation. To understand this 
argument, imagine how the U.S. telecommunications industry would function if the U.S. 
Federal Communications Commission, which controls the allocation and assignment of 
radio frequencies, had no defined rules or procedures for requesting and assigning radio 
frequencies. What if the only way forward for service providers and users who needed 
frequency bands would be to continually lobby the FCC’s Commissioners and staff 
persons, in effect begging them for frequencies? The lobbying (begging) efforts would 
not only have to convince the FCC to award them the specific frequencies they needed; 
they would also have to convince them that the FCC should even consider awarding any 
new frequency assignments at all. Obviously such a process, or rather absence of process, 
would act as a huge barrier to entry in the relevant industries, and would smother 
innovation and growth in radio-related areas. A great deal of investment of mental and 
physical energy would have to be diverted to lobbying and away from execution. 
ICANN’s current TLD addition process is not fixed, nor is it regular. No one 
knows when or why TLDs will be added. As noted in Section 1, its first round of 
additions treated the initial set of new TLDs as an “experiment” that began in 1999 and 
must be studied until 2005. Then, in late 2002, ICANN’s CEO suddenly declared that 
adding three new sponsored TLDs would be a good idea.22 This out-of-the-blue 
announcement did not emerge from any stable, defined process, but from insider 
lobbying by constituencies and applicants. In order to implement this proposal, ICANN’s 
staff had to develop a new set of criteria to be used in the selection of applications.23 The 
criteria are only applicable to this specific round, which is arbitrarily limited to 
“sponsored” TLDs.24 While at this point one can only express support for adding new 
TLDs to a long-suppressed market, ICANN’s 2003 sponsored TLD addition proposal 
                                                 
22 See http://www.icann.org/amsterdam/gtld-action-plan-topic.htm  
23 See http://www.icann.org/tlds/new-stld-rfp/new-stld-rfp-24jun03.htm. As is all too typical of 
ICANN, the criteria were proposed one day before they were to be discussed by the public at the Montreal 
meeting.  
24 “Sponsored” TLDs are supposed to be restricted to some bounded community of registrants, and 
managed by a sponsoring organization that ICANN deems to be representative of that community. Thus, 
.museum, delegated to the International Council of Museums, is a sponsored domain; registration under 
.museum is limited to organizations ICOM considers worthy of the label “museum.”  
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perpetuates the harmful idea that TLD additions are to be performed sporadically on an 
ad hoc basis rather than being regularized and routine. 
4.1.2 Responsive to market demand 
Addition of TLDs is not fundamentally a technical issue (once it takes place 
within the defined constraints); it is a matter of permitting supply to respond to demand. 
Whatever process is adopted should allow companies to respond to real or perceived 
needs in the marketplace. Since marketplace needs and demands change over time, the 
best way to assure responsiveness to demand is to make entry open to any qualifying 
applicant and allow market forces to determine which ideas are good and succeed, and 
which are not and fail. The root zone file manager should not impose artificial limits on 
entry or attempt to protect incumbents. New TLD names should be defined by applicants 
who have done the market research and are willing to invest the money and sweat equity 
required to get through the process. They should not be defined by central planners who 
think they know what names the world needs.  
By way of contrast, ICANN’s current process is not responsive to demand. 
Indeed, ICANN’s former CEO Stuart Lynn openly questioned whether TLD additions 
should pay attention to demand.25 
4.1.3 Fairness (Rule-driven rather than discretionary) 
The process for awarding TLDs should be governed by rules and specific criteria 
that are applied on a nondiscriminatory basis to all applicants. The process should not be 
driven by insider politics and the discretion of the ICANN Board. Insofar as possible, all 
relevant criteria for an award should be objective. Where human judgment is called for 
(e.g., trademark conflicts or issues of confusing similarity or deception) the process for 
resolving such disputes should be well-known (e.g., referral to an arbitration panel or 
alternative dispute resolution service with known rules and precedents). For those 
reasons, if there are more applications than available slots we propose to select from 
among noncommercial applicants using a random selection procedure; for commercial 
applicants, we propose to use auctions. Both procedures are completely objective. 
ICANN’s TLD addition process to date has been entirely discretionary. A variety 
of law and policy analysts have documented the striking parallels between ICANN’s 
authorization of new TLDs and the Federal Communications Commission’s licensing of 
broadcast stations.26 Broadcast licensing has been based on “comparative hearings,” in 
which applicants put before the Commission a host of promises about how they would 
“serve the public interest” and the Commissioners tried to discern from these promises 
which applicants have the most merit. The process earned the nickname “beauty 
contests” because choices were based more on the taste and discretion of the 
Commissioners than on any defined and objective criteria. By creating such wide latitude 
                                                 
25 Lynn, in the news article cited in note 16 above, noted that “some people” don’t think it is a 
good idea to respond to demand, and asked "Do we just respond to market demand... or do we structure the 
namespace according to some taxonomy, or in some third way?" 
26 Jonathan Weinberg (2002), Mueller (2002) chapter 10; Mannheim and Solum (2003). 
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for discretion, the broadcast licensing process heightened the importance of insider 
politics in the selection process. Lyndon Johnson’s exploitation of the Commission’s 
discretionary power over broadcast station channel allocation is an example of the kinds 
of abuses one can expect from an assignment system based on beauty contests.27  
But one need not rely on criticism of ICANN to support this point. ICANN’s own 
Board chairman, Vint Cerf, compared ICANN’s TLD selection process to the reviews of 
business plans conducted by a venture capital firm, and urged that ICANN find a way to 
“extract” itself from such nontechnical issues.28  
4.1.4 Efficient 
A TLD addition process should be economically efficient. This means two things.  
First, it should discourage rent-seeking behavior and the opportunities for legal 
conflict by applicants and incumbents. “Rent-seeking” refers to efforts by market 
participants to gain market power by investing in protectionist policies or favorable 
subsidies.29 ICANN’s current process is tantamount to an engraved invitation to engage 
in rent-seeking. With new entry completely subject to the whims of ICANN’s 
management and Board, applicants and their opponents and competitors have no choice 
but to invest heavily in politics. Open entry according to a defined procedure dramatically 
reduces such unproductive activity, by eliminating discretion of the Board and hard-
wiring new entry into the system.  
Second, the process should make sure that the administrative and opportunity 
costs of an application, and the costs of actually implementing TLD additions in the root 
server system, are borne by those who create the costs. TLD application fees should 
reflect as precisely as possible the actual costs of reviewing applications for conformity 
to defined, objective criteria. They should not be used as a means of financing ICANN’s 
general budget. If adding 40 TLDs a year led to costs of hiring one full-time staff to 
manage and review changes in the root zone file, then 1/40 of that amount should be part 
of the fees assigned to each successful applicant. Likewise, if adding TLDs can be 
projected to affect the hardware and software costs of the root server operators by a 
defined amount, then 1/40 of that amount should be part of the fees assigned to each 
successful applicant, and the monies distributed to the root server operators.  
4.1.5 Technically safe 
Finally, the procedure for actually adding TLDs to the zone files, and the limits 
placed on the number of changes each year, should fall safely within the technical 
                                                 
27 Texas television station KTBS (Channel 7) went on the air in November 1952, after a long 
freeze of TV station licensing. We now know that LBJ had worked behind the scenes throughout the freeze 
to make sure that the FCC Order allocated only one VHF channel to Austin, and that his family would get 
it. http://www.emmyonline.org/tvq/articles/32-23-10.asp  
28 Quoted in Brock Meeks, “ICANN and the seven dwarves” (MSNBC News, Nov. 22, 2000). 
29 A more technical definition is “the expenditure of social resources to capture wealth transfers.” 
See J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison, and G. Tullock, Toward a Theory of a Rent-Seeking Society, College 
Station: Texas Tech University Press, 1980. 
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capabilities of the root server system. As we have shown in Section 3, this means a finite 
limit, somewhere in the tens of TLDs each year, on TLD addition-related changes in the 
root zone.  
4.2 A TLD Addition Process 
Below, we propose a process for TLD additions. Using this process, ICANN 
would add a maximum of 40 new TLDs each year. (There is nothing magic about this 
particular number. Technical constraints indicate that it is safest to remain in the “tens” 
per year, but it could be 30 or 50. One does, however, need a specific number to 
implement the procedure.) Our process, which could be implemented by the end of 2004, 
involves the following steps: 
4.2.1 Call for applications (2 weeks) 
ICANN would announce two distinct two-week periods each year for applicants 
to register their desired TLD string in ICANN’s application registry. The process would 
be separated into noncommercial and commercial rounds. The noncommercial round 
would be restricted to nonprofit organizations and Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs). 
(ICANN would have to carefully define the criteria for noncommercial applicants; one 
suggestion is to use the United Nations definition of LDCs.) The commercial round 
would be open to any type of applicant. Applicants would pay a modest, cost-based 
administrative fee (most likely around a thousand US dollars) for each name they apply 
for. The noncommercial round might be held in the first quarter of the year, the 
commercial round in the third quarter. During the application period, applicants would 
lay claim to any unoccupied TLD string.  
The applications may want to include a fitness disclosure and a statement of 
financial capability showing access to the financial resources needed to operate a registry, 
or an affiliation with an accredited registry. But a more open system would allow brokers 
and resellers to apply as well. 
Noncommercial/LDC applicants could only propose one TLD string.  
Commercial applicants could propose any number of TLD strings, but during the auction 
process (see step 4.2.3 below) they would only be able to win two. ICANN would allow 
new commercial names to be proposed by anyone: interested communities, incumbent 
registry operators, entrepreneurs, etc. Whether the business models proposed were 
“sponsored” or “unsponsored,” “restricted” or not, would be up to the applicants; it 
would not affect the selection procedure. 
4.2.2 Noncommercial Applicants: Eligibility Check & Random Selection (2 
months) 
After the application registration period ends, ICANN would check for eligibility 
and eliminate any ineligible applications. If there were more than 10 eligible applications 
for noncommercial names a random selection process would be held to select the 10 
qualifying applicants. To prevent abuse or possible manipulation of the random selection 
process, we propose that TLD delegations emerging from this process cannot be sold or 
transferred to commercial entities. 
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4.2.3 Commercial Applicants: Auctions (3 months) 
In order to avoid any conflict or confusion over which TLD names were available, 
the noncommercial selection must be concluded before the application period opened for 
commercial applicants. If eligible commercial applications for more than 30 TLD strings 
were received, a bidding process would be triggered. ICANN would have the right to set 
a reservation price at the level of its costs of processing and implementing TLD 
additions.  
We envision a simultaneous multiple round auction in which applicants would bid 
to get one or two of their proposed strings into the top 30. We believe this can be 
implemented in a web-based, eBay-type interface. To repeat, while applicants can 
propose any number of TLD strings (paying a separate application fee for each one), they 
can only win a maximum of two in the auction. In each round of the auction, the 30 TLD 
strings attracting the highest bids would be listed. In the next round, applicants would 
then decide either to bid more to push their proposed TLD into the top 30, or drop out. 
When the bidding stops, the final result is known. If multiple commercial applicants were 
after the same TLD, the top bidder for the TLD would get it.  
A number of auction procedures exist and economic research on the topic is well 
developed enough to support the design of auction procedures for specific purposes. Any 
actual implementation of this plan would of course need to pay careful attention to the 
details of the auction design. We do suggest that when the auction is finished, each of the 
top 30 applicants pay the same fee as the lowest winning bidder, rather than the amount 
of their bid, except when there was competitive bidding for the same TLD string by 
multiple applicants, in which case the high bidder would pay the second-highest bid to 
win the name.30  
Proceeds of the auction would finance activities directly related to modifying and 
maintaining the root zone. A defined portion of the fees could be allocated to the root 
server operators.31 Of course, if less than 30 eligible commercial applications were 
received, no bidding process would be triggered. In that case, all qualifying applicants 
would simply pay ICANN’s reservation price. This price, too, should include some 
payment to support root server operation. 
4.2.4 IPR Challenge (2 months) 
In both the commercial and noncommercial processes, after settling the issue of 
which TLD strings should be added the successful names, plus an additional 5 alternate 
names that were the next-highest ranked in the auction or random selection process, 
would be published. At that point a period set aside for intellectual property challenges 
would go into effect. If a TLD was confusingly similar to an existing TLD or threatened 
to violate a trademark, it could be challenged and subjected to a dispute resolution 
procedure. With some adaptation, UDRP principles provide a good basis for resolving 
                                                 
30 Except in cases of competitive bidding over the same string, in which case the winning bidder 
should pay the amount they bid. 
31 This prospect however raises issues about the contractual relationship between ICANN and the 
root server operators that go well beyond the scope of this paper.  
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TLD disputes; e.g., confusing similarity to a trademark, trade name, or trade name 
acronym or existing TLD; lack of a right or legitimate interest in the name; evidence of 
bad faith (although notions of bad faith would not be able to incorporate evidence from 
the way the name was used because no use has taken place yet). Clearly, the global 
strength of the mark in question would be a new and very important consideration. 
Whereas a <.aol> top-level domain might be prohibited for anyone by AOL-Time 
Warner, there are many companies that use “National” as a trademark, and hence a 
<.national> top-level domain name might pass. The IPR challenge procedure applies only 
to challenges to the string itself – it does not involve challenges to the procedures or 
policies used by the registry to assign names.  
TLD strings eliminated through the IPR challenge process would be refunded 
their auction payment (with the costs of the challenge proceeding deducted) but not their 
application processing fees. The next highest-ranking alternate name that made it through 
the IPR challenge process would then be eligible for the next step. 
4.2.5 Contracting (1 week) 
After the IPR challenge period expired and disputes were resolved ICANN would 
present the successful remaining applicants with standard registry contracts. We 
emphasize that the contracts should be standardized and uniform, not developed on a 
case-by-case basis for each registry. As standardized contracts they would be less 
intrusive and less regulatory than ICANN’s current registry contracts. The contracts 
would require adherence to a minimal set of ICANN-defined technical specifications and 
conformity to established ICANN policies. This would include standards for transferring 
a zone file that would allow DNS to be maintained if a registry failed. This might also 
include, for example, a commitment to bind registrants in unrestricted, unsponsored 
domains to use the UDRP. We do not, however, think it necessary for the contract to 
require registrar-registry split, nor do we think it necessary for the contract to cap the 
price of services in new TLDs. New TLD operators could not possibly be dominant 
market actors, and no one has to register in their domain. Ergo, no price cap is necessary. 
4.2.6 Entry into the Root Zone (2 weeks) 
The final step would be the entry of the contracting parties’ information into the 
root zone. Currently this would require the approval of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce; whether that would be necessary and appropriate in the long term is a policy 
issue outside the scope of this paper. 
Note that while this procedure uses auctions and random selection to ration TLD 
additions when there are too many applications, the procedure does not presume that 
rationing is necessary. If fewer than 30 commercial applications (or fewer than 10 LDC 
or noncommercial sponsored applications) were received, no competitive bidding (or 
random selection) would be required. Applicants would be added merely by paying 
ICANN’s application fee and its processing fee. The procedure would permit the addition 
of up to 40 TLDs annually for an indefinite period of time, so it is possible that the limits 
would not be reached some years. 
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5. Anticipating the Debate 
In the previous section we defined a flexible, market-oriented approach to TLD 
additions. In this section we examine various arguments that might be made against the 
procedure.  
5.1 Defensive registrations and IPR  
The biggest objection to regular TLD additions is likely to come from major 
trademark holders. Many of them view new TLDs not as expansions of choice in the 
domain name market but as additional costs of business. They may believe that adding 
new name spaces under new TLDs imposes upon them the burden of registering their 
trademarks and brand names in new TLDs again and again, in order to protect them from 
name speculators and cybersquatters. The costs of these additional registrations to any 
individual company are perceived as small relative to the potential nuisance value of 
misappropriated or misused names, but the aggregate value of defensive registrations is 
probably around US$ 10 – 15 million.32 
Some registrars and registries have deliberately played upon these fears, using 
promotional strategies designed to scare brand holders into registering the same domain 
names across all TLDs in order to prevent others from getting them. In the late 1990s, 
this led to the creation of a vicious cycle that fueled the bubble in the DNS market, as 
speculators and trademark owners entered into a race to register, preempt or recover 
millions of domain names.33 
While trademark holders’ concerns are legitimate, shutting down expansion of the 
name space is not the solution. Moreover, it is a remedy that is out of proportion to the 
damage inflicted. It erases potentially hundreds of millions, possibly billions of dollars of 
added value in order to foreclose the possibility of a much smaller level of harm. 
Name speculation and cybersquatting are business activities. As such, they hinge 
on two economic factors: 1) the willingness of someone else to buy the name, and 2) the 
ability of the name to deliver Web traffic (or some other kind of value) for the registrant. 
The first factor, of course, is completely dependent upon the second.  
A routine TLD addition procedure attacks name speculation at its root. It makes 
the supply of domain names so abundant that the possession of any given character string 
is less important.34 In a regime of domain name abundance, web sites and services will 
gain attention by developing reputations and offering users value – not by having a 
                                                 
32 Author’s estimates based on registration statistics from <.com>, <.org>, and Edelman/Zittrain 
studies of the <.biz>, and “open ccTLD” domains. 
33 Milton Mueller, “Success by Default: A new profile of domain name trademark disputes under 
ICANN’s UDRP,” Syracuse: The Convergence Center, 2002. http://dcc.syr.edu/reports.htm  
34 It is noteworthy that in ICANN’s first round of TLD additions, one of the most vocal critics of 
adding any new TLDs was an individual who had invested heavily in speculative registrations in the .MD 
top-level domain (the country code for Moldova).  
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scarcity value or special meaning. The domain name will be relegated to the status of a 
mnemonic identifier – which is all it was supposed to be all along. 
The limited number of gTLDs was the initial cause of the cybersquatting problem. 
Perpetuating scarcity only perpetuates the economic forces that fuel the problem. An 
open market for TLD supply would do more to “normalize” the status of domain names 
than continued limits on entry. While it may cause trademark holders concern in the short 
term, it is really the only long-term solution to the problem. 
5.1.1 Why the Dominance of COM is part of the problem  
The mutually reinforcing cycle of cybersquatting and defensive registration was a 
product of the historical dominance of the name space by the <.com> TLD. We may not 
realize it now, but in the early days of the web (late 1996 and early 1997) nearly 80 
percent of all domain name registrations in the world were concentrated in <.com>.35 
Moreover, there were only a million or so registered domain names. Thus, common, 
simple domain names under <.com> had great power at that time. Many people navigated 
the Web by guessing the domain name and typing it directly into their browser. What 
gave domain names their business value was their ability, or potential, to deliver large 
quantities of web traffic. Well-known trademarks and brand names under <.com> were 
especially vulnerable to squatting, because of users’ propensity to rely on guessed names. 
This propensity was reinforced strongly by the web browsers’ method of automatically 
placing the <.com> extension at the end of any name typed into the URL window. 
Under these unique – and bygone – conditions short, generic or branded second-
level domain names under the <.com> gTLD were scarce and valuable commodities. 
Name speculation was a predictable response. By occupying large numbers of generic 
words or other names in the <.com> space, speculators hoped to maximize their chances 
of profiting from the demand of someone who wanted that particular string, or of 
capturing web traffic of users who typed in common generic words as a way of searching 
the Web. 
These conditions have already changed substantially. Evidence of major change is 
apparent from the following facts: 
• There are far too many registered domain names under the major gTLDs 
(nearly 30 million) to rely on guessing anymore. Users now rely primarily 
on search engines and portals to navigate the web.  
• The most popular browser software (Internet Explorer 6) no longer 
appends <.com> to words typed into the URL, but acts more like a search 
engine, returning a list of web sites that might correspond to the desired 
keywords regardless of what domain name they are under.  
• Search engines have improved greatly. Typing a few keywords into 
Google is more likely to direct users to where they want to go than 
guessing a domain name. Indeed, contention about how Google ranks its 
                                                 
35 InterNIC, Network Wizards  
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search results have replaced domain name registration as the great 
preoccupation of the Internet economy.36 
• Reflecting the lowered value of domain names, millions of speculative and 
defensive registrations were not renewed in 2002, deflating the <.com> 
TLD by about ten million registrations, and other legacy gTLDs by a 
comparable percentage.  
• The same decline in speculative and squatter registrations apparent in 
<.com> was seen in the country code domains that were converted into 
open TLDs and marketed as competitors to the gTLDs, such as <.cc>, 
<.tv>, and <.ws>.37 
• ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy process has 
provided trademark owners a way to recover abusive registrations, 
diminishing the incentives to profit from it. Moreover, the number of 
trademark – domain name conflicts taken to plummeted as the speculative 
boom in domain names has receded.38 
5.1.2 Realism in Trademark Protection 
The new conditions have led to a more realistic attitude among many Internet-
savvy trademark lawyers. Lucy Nichols, the chief trademark attorney for one of the 
world’s most significant brand names, Nokia, observes that: 
“There are over 3000 registrations that contain "Nokia" in the open gTLDs.  
Those registrations fall into one of four categories ...1) ones that we own; 2) 
inactive ones; 3) non-Nokia sites that can be considered "fair use" ...including 
critical sites; and 4) truly objectionable sites that involve misleading, fraudulent or 
dilutive commercial use of the Nokia brand. I concentrate my resources on 
number four.  It's a waste of time and effort to focus resources on 2) and unfair 
with respect to 3).  For registrations in category 2, I'd rather someone else pay for 
the registration fees and renewal fees and keep the names inactive and off the 
market.  I don't believe that the dilution argument should be expanded to cover 
domain names that are not being used.”39 
At bottom, defensive registrations are fueled by the increasingly unrealistic fear 
that unless a company controls every manifestation of its name in the domain name 
space, it will lose customers or traffic. But it is not easy to attract large amounts of traffic 
                                                 
36 “Google Battles ‘Optimizers,’” Wall St. Journal, Feb 26, 2003. 
37 “The large number of expiring registrations in .CC suggests a decrease in size of at least that 
ccTLD and perhaps open ccTLDs generally. One interpretation of this fact is that speculators, squatters, 
and warehousers may be learning that the open ccTLD market is not as profitable as they had hoped or 
expected…” B. Edelman, “Registrations in Open ccTLDs.” 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/open-cctlds/ 
38 Mueller, “Success by Default” (2002), note 33 above 
39 Lucy Nichols, speaking at “Trademarks in Cyberspace,” INTA Conference, New York, October 
23, 2002 
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to a web site. Under current conditions, mere registration of a domain name, no matter 
how appealing or generic the name, will no longer do it. Not when there are 22 million 
second-level names in .com alone, and 50 million domain names worldwide. Web sites 
must be advertised and promoted to attract attention. Today, the most serious problems 
associated with domain name use concern the re-registration of expired names by 
pornographers. Registering once-popular domain names can instantly deliver thousands 
of hits after making only a very small investment. The most important issues users face 
today have to do with protecting investments in names they are already using and have 
built up equity in – issues such as how domain names are renewed, deleted or transferred 
among registrars. Restricting the market for TLDs is a response to the problems of 1996, 
not the issues of 2003.   
ICANN’s policy toward TLD addition perpetuated artificial scarcity, and hence 
prolonged the problems associated with it. It chose to create only two new open, 
commercial TLDs (.info and .biz), thus creating a nice, fat target for speculators, 
cybersquatters and defensive registrations. Artificial scarcity necessitated “sunrise” 
procedures and other adjustments to the expected “land rush”. Even so, the number of 
defensive registrations was much lower than expectations. Early fears were that a new 
TLD might attract as many as 1 or 2 million defensive registrations alone. In reality, 
neither TLD has managed to exceed 2 million registrations in total, and one study 
estimates the number of defensive registrations as about 20 percent of the total, or about 
150,000.40 At any rate, the environment created by this artificial limit on the number of 
new TLDs cannot be used to predict how the market or user behavior would respond to a 
regime of regularized open entry.  
5.2 Are auctions the right assignment method? 
Some criticism may focus upon auctions as an assignment method. We feel that 
auctions are the best way to determine who should get a commercial TLD when not all 
demands can be satisfied. The bids reflect the real opportunity cost of picking one 
applicant over another. For applicants, it is a more determinate procedure than a beauty 
contest. They know that their chances of success increase with every increase in the 
monetary value of their bid. At every round of the auction process, they can see what they 
need to do to get their TLD in the accepted pool. In a comparative selection process by 
the Board, on the other hand, applicants have no idea how much additional investment in 
preparation or lobbying will increase their chances of success. It is a more impartial and 
objective method of selection, eliminating board discretion. 
We recognize various potential problems with auctions. The proposed addition of 
30 commercial TLDs per year is a somewhat arbitrary number. If the real demand for 
TLDs far exceeded that number, auction prices could be bid up to high levels, imposing 
higher costs on applicants. However, our proposal that the winning bidders pay only the 
                                                 
40 Ben Edelman, “Survey of Usage of the .biz TLD,” June 2002. 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/tlds/001/  
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amount of the lowest successful bid would do a lot to ensure that the auction prices paid 
would remain at reasonable levels.41 
Our proposal also recognizes that market prices are not always the most 
appropriate way to allocate resources. Because developing countries and noncommercial 
applicants may have a worthy proposal but be unable to outbid commercial applicants, 
we have proposed a reservation (10 noncommercial TLDs) and a random selection 
procedure for assigning those TLDs. Of course, not all noncommercial applicants have 
few resources. Some may wish to enter the auction in order to achieve greater certainty in 
the acquisition of a TLD, and to increase their right to transfer or sell the delegation. 
Some may note that in wireless telecommunications, auctions have produced what 
appear to be inflated prices for spectrum assignments, creating financial burdens on 
prospective service providers. This is not a valid criticism of our procedure for assigning 
domain names. The 3G auctions were a once-off deal, an auction in which all the 
spectrum available for 3G development was offered at once in an artificially limited 
number of licenses. Failure to participate in this auction meant that service companies 
were blocked from the 3G market forever. Many economists criticized the structure of 
these auctions as encouraging monopolization of the market and inflating prices for 
spectrum.42 In our procedure, the name space would be expanded continuously at a 
defined rate (40 new TLDs per year). This would reduce the scarcity value of bids in any 
given auction, and would be very unlikely to produce the kind of inflated, speculative 
prices associated with the 3G auctions. 
Recall that ICANN’s initial set of TLD applications required a US$ 50,000 fee. 
That led to only 44 applications at the height of the domain name boom. It is quite 
possible that had our auction procedures been used back then applicants would have paid 
less than $50,000 each. 
Some may worry that this method of TLD addition would push the .com problem 
to the top level, as every company in the world tried to get its name in the top level.  But 
a maximum of 30 commercial TLDs can be added to the root every year under the 
procedure we propose. At that pace, it would take 100 years to add only 3000 company 
names. Also, firms that are interested will have to pay cost-recovering fees and, if there is 
a mad rush of applicants, outbid all other applicants to be successful. Companies that 
                                                 
41 Bidders only have to pay the price set by the 30th-ranked bidder. For example, if the highest 
bidder in the auction bids $100 million for a <.sex> TLD and the 30th-ranked bidder offers $75,000 for a 
<.wine> TLD, all 30 successful applicants would pay $75,000. However, if there were multiple bidders for 
.sex, an ascending bid auction would be held and the winner would have to pay the second-highest price, 
which could be substantial. In those cases, however, the high prices would be confined to the strings with 
the highest commercial value, and in those cases we think it appropriate that any winner pay the market 
price for it. 
42 “The limitation of the number of national UMTS licenses to 4-6 has not been determined by 
spectrum scarcity, but rather by national policy decisions. Most countries could issue eight or ten licenses if 
they wished. And the World Radio Council (WRC) allocated even more spectrum in May 2000 for 3G 
assignment. This so called spectrum scarcity for 3G licenses is an artificial barrier to entry created national 
government policies.” William Melody, “Assessing Highly Imperfect Mobile Markets,” 
Telecommunications Policy 25,1 and 2 (March 2001). http://www.tpeditor.com/editorials/2001/ed25-
1+2.htm  
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cannot generate substantial revenue or business value from the services derived from a 
TLD are not going to throw money away in an auction for a resource they don’t need.  
Finally, some may ask: “Who gets the money from the auctions?” Ideally, 
ICANN and the root server operators should split the proceeds according to a formula 
that reflects the relative cost burdens imposed on them by adding TLDs. We 
acknowledge that if TLDs prove to be unexpectedly popular and very high auction prices 
result, this could produce an embarrassment of riches. We welcome suggestions as to 
other forms of distribution of the proceeds. We also acknowledge that many non-US 
organizations will be less than thrilled about paying large sums to a U.S. government 
contractor, but this is an implied criticism of the institutional arrangement, not of the 
auction procedure.  
5.3 Do we need a “taxonomy” of sponsored, restricted domains? 
One proposal is that new TLDs should be permitted but all new TLDs would be 
part of a fixed, mutually exclusive set of categories defined by ICANN.43 Under one 
variant of this proposal, all new TLDs would be sponsored and restricted, and registries 
will be forced to authenticate registrants “to ensure that they are registering names that 
are germane to their businesses and not infringing on another's intellectual property.”44 
While this highly restrictive approach takes the taxonomy idea to its logical conclusion, 
in theory it is possible to advocate a taxonomic approach without linking it to restrictive 
and mutually exclusive domains. One could merely believe that ICANN should select the 
names and that the TLD names selected should strive to function as some kind of 
directory of the Internet.  
Forcing all new TLDs to carefully authenticate a correspondence between the 
identity of a registrant and the TLD name would make all domain name registration a 
slow and manual process. Costs would quadruple over what users pay now. With the 
exception of a few very small TLDs that are noncommercial and subsidized (e.g., .edu, 
.mil and .museum) efforts to restrict access to domains have proven to be more difficult 
than expected. Both .biz and .name, for example, contain thousands of registrations that 
do not conform to the policy restrictions associated with the domain.  
We do not oppose and may often favor the creation of new TLDs that are 
sponsored and restricted. But we also recognize that many users have no interest in or 
need for authenticated and restricted domains. That is why there are thousands of times 
more registrations in open domains than in restricted domains.  
                                                 
43 “This taxonomised structure opens up a range of places where individuals, companies and 
organisations will find a place they want to be, and where users can easily find them. … The ability to buy 
a name in a particular TLD will be  restricted to those who can demonstrate they are bona fide members of 
the target group. 
44 BC position on new gTLDs December 2002 page 2.  
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As Mannheim and Solum (2003) have argued, a top-down approach to naming 
cannot be responsive to actual user demand and user needs.45 It is impossible for ICANN 
or any central authority to predict what names or categories users will find useful and 
desirable. Tastes, conditions, and names of interest change over time. Names like <.blog> 
and <.enum>, utterly meaningless a few years ago, have entered our vocabulary and 
become important. Linguistic, economic, and political diversity militate against atop-
down approach. A uniform categorization scheme will result in semantic conflicts; a 
category name in English might mean something completely different in German.  
Advocates of a “taxonomic approach” believe that by grouping millions of 
domain names into defined categories, ICANN will make it easier for Internet users to 
“find things on the Internet.” This premise is incorrect. As discussed above, Internet users 
do not search the Internet by scanning lists of domain names. Even if a clean, intuitive 
“taxonomy” of TLDs could be defined, each TLD would have at minimum thousands of 
entries in it. The largest ones (like .com, .net, .org, .de and co.uk) would have tens of 
millions of entries. No one seeks content by scanning a list of registered domain names 
and trying to guess what services or content is stored at them. Users have a variety of far 
more sophisticated tools at their disposal, such as search engines, portals, and referrals.  
The primary function of domain names is not to help up find things we are 
looking for. Domain names are not a directory and have only minimal usefulness as a 
search token. Domain names are just memorable identifiers. Their purpose is to assist us 
in easier communication of an identifier. They need to be memorable, not systematic. 
Most people's memory works through association rather than categorizing. 
ICANN’s basic mission is simply to coordinate unique parameters to permit 
stable and consistent operation of the root zone. It should not attempt to tell the public 
what names they “ought” to adopt or what categories they “ought” to fit into. 
5.4 Should names be separated from registries? 
Another potential criticism of our proposal is that registries should have no 
control over the TLD names that they operate. Instead, ICANN will define all TLD 
names and assign operation of the names to “qualified” registry operators.  
The fundamental difference between this proposal and ours is that name additions 
are not demand-driven and regular, but are imposed on the market in a top-down fashion. 
In that respect, the proposal is similar to the “taxonomic” idea discussed above.  But 
separating the name from the registry has important implications for the market structure 
and market process of the domain name registration industry.  
First, competitive entry would be discouraged by the inability of a registry 
operator to have any control over the name they supplied. It is noteworthy that all new 
entry into the domain name registry market since ICANN’s inception has come from 
specific registry operators interested in supporting specific names that they believe would 
attract specific user communities. The separation concept reveals a very basic lack of 
                                                 
45 Karl Manheim and Lawrence Solum, “The Case for gTLD Auctions: A Framework for 
Evaluating Domain Name Policy,” Loyola Law School (Los Angeles) Public Law and Legal Theory, 
Research Paper no. 2003-14, May 2003. 
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understanding as to how markets operate and how innovation and competition occur in a 
market economy. Consider the following questions: 
 Who is going to finance and build a domain name registry when they have no idea 
what name, if any, they are going to operate?  
 How can prospective registries construct a business plan and raise capital if they 
do not know whether they will be awarded something on the scale of <.com> 
(tens of millions of registrations) or something on the scale of <.museum> (with 
only two thousand registrations)?  
 How can prospective registries develop effective marketing and branding 
concepts if they have no interest in the name per se and no prior ties to the 
communities served by the TLD?  
 Why should a community of Internet users that invests time and money in getting 
a name established have no control over which operator provides them with 
registry service? 
 Separating the name from the registry would harm technical innovation. 
Registries are databases. The structure and operation of a database are very 
sensitive to the type of data one is dealing with and the unique needs of the users 
of the data.  
Separating the name and the registry does not make it easier or more efficient to 
protect the investment of registrants when a registry goes out of business. The only 
protection that users can have against a failing registry is that its DNS records are stored 
somewhere and can be transferred to a new operator willing and able to serve them. 
Under a normal, market-oriented regime failing registries would sell their customer base 
and associated records to a surviving registry. In a competitive market many operators 
will be happy to purchase additional customer base. In a regime where ICANN controls 
assignment of names to registries ICANN will, at best, ask available operators which 
registry wants to take over the names, and if multiple operators are interested it will hold 
an auction for that right. This is not much different than the effect of a market, except for 
the interposition of an intermediary. At worst, ICANN will simply order a registry to take 
over and serve the names regardless of whether it wants to or it feels it has the capacity to 
do so – a method unlikely to produce good service. At any rate either response to failure 
does not require strict separation of the name from the registry. ICANN could have the 
authority to order existing registries to take over the names of failing registries regardless 
of how names are initially proposed and assigned. 
Finally, any TLD creation method that separates names from registries must 
determine how would names be initially assigned to registries. If names are assigned to 
registries based on ad hoc decisions of ICANN’s Board or staff, then the assignment 
process is rife with opportunities for political haggling, discrimination, collusion and 
insider dealing (registries and registrars play a major role in selecting the Board). If 
names are assigned on the basis of competitive bidding, then the bids will reflect the 
value expected of specific names, and the results would be very close to our own 
proposal, which allows registries to propose their own names and bid for the right to 
operate them. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
This paper has argued that ICANN can best serve Internet users, developing 
countries, non-governmental organizations and the domain name industry by rapidly but 
carefully implementing routine procedures for management of the Domain Name System.  
The most important conclusion of our research is that ICANN’s TLD assignment 
procedures need to be regularly scheduled and objective. ICANN has needlessly mired 
itself in insider politicking and discriminatory decision making by failing to adopt 
objective, routine procedures for expanding the DNS name space.  
We have demonstrated how ICANN’s procedures for adding TLDs can be 
demand-driven, light handed, and focused on coordinating the technical parameters of 
DNS.  Further, we have offered our thoughts on how users and suppliers interacting in a 
market can decide if specific Top Level Domains (TLDs) are valuable.   
The positive benefits of adoption and implementation of the proposed reformed 
Internet governance processes will readily become apparent to ICANN staff, volunteer 
participants in its activities, firms and industries affected by ICANN’s actions, as well as 
national governments and international organizations alike.  Implementation will remove 
one of the major thorns in the side of all who deal with ICANN and by extension the U.S 
government policymakers still legally responsible for oversight of its functions.  
By clearly delimiting ICANN’s responsibilities as well as the responsibilities and 
rights of private actors as well as non-profit organizations in the governance process for 
allocation of top level domains, the Internet as a whole will benefit from regular and 
objective processes. We are confident that that will be most welcome, given the 
continued flux and uncertainty is so many other aspects of the Internet. Appropriate 
attention can be paid to those other issues, once the problem of top level domain 
allocation is resolved.  
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